Plaintiff Church of Scientology International ("the Church") has brought this litigation as a necessary step to preserve its ability to effect recovery from Gerald Armstrong upon receiving an award of liquidated, general, and punitive damages in the two cases which it has pending against these defendants in the

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Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, No. BC 052395 and BC 084642. Armstrong has sought to avoid the consequences of the liquidated damages clause in the 1986 Settlement Agreement and of his numerous violations of that Agreement by hiding his assets. To that end, he transferred his real property, a house on Fawn Drive in Marin County, to his friend and attorney, defendant Michael Walton. This transfer was made without consideration, although the house and land were apparently worth in excess of \$397,500. Further, Armstrong has claimed in deposition to have substantial assets in the form of manuscripts and artistic works. At least some of these assets were transferred to Armstrong's alter ego, defendant Gerald Armstrong Corporation.

The Church has sought production of documents relating to the existence and conveyance of Armstrong's assets. These requests for production have been met with meritless objections and a refusal to engage in a meaningful meet-and-confer process.

Consequently the Church has brought this motion in accordance with C.C.P. §2030(1) to compel the production of the relevant documents.

#### II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Church served Armstrong with its First Request for Production of Documents [Exhibit A to Declaration of Andrew Wilson], on August 9, 1993. Armstrong's responses and/or objections were due on September 3, 1993, and the document production was due on September 13. Armstrong did not produce any documents at all. Instead, after obtaining an extension of time in which to respond, he served responses consisting completely of objections, on October 4, 1993 [Exhibit B to Declaration of Andrew

Wilson]. Counsel for the Church immediately contacted Armstrong's counsel, and attempted to meet and confer with him concerning the inadequacy of the responses. [Exhibit C to Declaration of Andrew Wilson, ¶\_\_.] Armstrong's counsel refused to discuss the responses, and insisted that Mr. Wilson "write him a letter."

[Id.] Mr. Wilson did so, detailing the reasons why the objections were not adequate. [Id.] Mr. Greene never responded to Mr. Wilson's letter, and has produced no documents.

The requests, ten in all, seek documents which are directly relevant to the Church's fraudulent conveyance action. They ask for documents which evidence transfers of assets, whether tangible or intangible, between Armstrong and defendants Walton and the Gerald Armstrong Corporation. On August 5, 1993, Armstrong boasted on national television that he had developed, and was trying to sell, a screenplay. The requests thus seek production of documents relating to the creation, transfer, sale or exploitation of this or other literary and artistic assets. These matters are directly relevant to the issue of Armstrong's assets and whether and how he may be attempting to transfer them out of his apparent direct control to avoid obligations owed to the Church.

In response to each request, Armstrong has asserted a series of boilerplate objections, claiming that the request violates the right to privacy, freedom of religion, speech, press and association; is not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is irrelevant; violates an unspecified "order" of the Los Angeles Superior Court; and is ambiguous, overbroad, vague, burdensome, and "harassive."

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## III. ARGUMENT

A. The Requests Do Not Violate Any Privacy Rights

Armstrong has objected to each of the Church's requests by claiming that the requests "violate the right to privacy."

Privacy rights are not absolute. The courts must balance the privacy rights of persons subject to discovery against the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts and the public interest in obtaining just results in litigation. Vinson v.

Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 299;

Valley Bank v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 555. Even very personal and confidential information may have to be disclosed if "essential to a fair determination of the lawsuit." Morales v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 283, 160 Cal.Rptr. 194.

Armstrong does not identify whose "right to privacy" is allegedly violated by the requests. Even assuming arguendo that Armstrong is attempting to assert his own privacy interests, the objection is simply irrelevant to the Church's requests. The Church seeks documents relating to Armstrong's creation, sale, exploitation and transfer of assets: the very subject matter of this litigation [See Exhibit A to Declaration of Andrew Wilson, Requests 1, 2, 9, 10].

Further, Armstrong can hardly claim a "privacy" interest in a document which he displayed on national television. [Ex. D to Wilson Dec., Transcript.] Requests 3 - 8 all seek documents relating to the asset which Armstrong attempted to peddle on the television show, Entertainment Tonight.

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# B. First Amendment Privileges Are Not Applicable To the Requested Documents

Next, Armstrong claims that the requests violate a whole panoply of his First Amendment rights: the rights to freedom of religion, speech, association and press. Armstrong has offered no explanation as to how the Church's reasonable requests for documents relating to his assets could possibly violate any of Armstrong's First Amendment rights. This action is directed at Armstrong's conveyance of assets so as to essentially render himself judgment proof, while at the same time engaging in what he admits (and in fact boasts of) were breaches of the December, 1986 settlement agreement with the Church. The Church has been unable to find any authority which even remotely suggests that Armstrong may refuse to produce documents relative to his assets in a fraudulent conveyance action by claiming that such production would somehow violate his right to freely practice his religion, or associate with persons of his choice. The Church's request that Armstrong supply such authority, if any exists, was met with silence. [Wilson Dec., Paragraph 2]

#### C. All Of The Requests Seek Relevant Documents

C.C.P. §2017(a) provides that a party may obtain discovery

[R]egarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or any other party to the action.

The discovery provisions are interpreted liberally, with all doubt resolved in favor of permitting discovery. <u>Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court</u> (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790,

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183 Cal.Rptr. 810, 813, fn. 7-8; <u>Greyhound Corp. v. Superior</u>

<u>Court</u>, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal.Rptr. 90; <u>Davies v. Superior Court</u>, 36

Cal.3d 291, 204 Cal.Rptr. 154.

Here, in a fraudulent conveyance action, the Church has requested that Armstrong produce documents relating to his assets: tangible, intangible, literary, and artistic; and the Church has requested that Armstrong produce documents which relate to transfers of that property to Armstrong's co-defendants. It is difficult to imagine material which is more relevant to a fraudulent conveyance action, or more likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, than these initial ten requests.

#### D. The Requests Are Specific And Clear

Armstrong also objects that the requests are "burdensome," "vague," "harassive," and "ambiguous." During meet and confer, the Church asked Armstrong's counsel to identify, for each of the ten requests, what he considered to be vague or unclear, and what about the request presented an undue burden. Mr. Greene did not respond, so the Church is left to wonder what it is about these clear, specifically drawn requests that Armstrong and his counsel do not understand. Each of them asks for documents concerning assets which Armstrong has identified, and which Armstrong has or may have conveyed to others. This is not a "burdensome" request when made in the context of fraudulent conveyance litigation.

### E. The Requests Are Not Prohibited By Any Other Court Order

Finally, Armstrong objects by claiming that an order exists which prohibits discovery in this action. In fact, this Court has already denied not one, but two, attempts by Armstrong to stay discovery herein. The cases pending in Los Angeles are, indeed,

stayed while the Court of Appeal considers Armstrong's appeal of the preliminary injunction which that Court granted to the Church. Discovery there, however, has nothing to do with discovery here. Nothing in any order of the Los Angeles court can reasonably be construed to prohibit, stay or interfere with discovery here; at most, the stay in those cases has put discovery therein on hold. Armstrong's attempt to parlay that stay into an excuse to refuse to produce documents relevant to this action is frivolous.

#### CONCLUSION

The Church has requested that Armstrong produce documents which concern the creation, sale, exploitation and transfer of documents which directly relate to the claims alleged in assets: the Complaint herein. In response, Armstrong has interjected a lengthy series of inappropriate objections, refused to meet and confer, and refused to produce a single document. Armstrong should be ordered to produce all responsive documents forthwith. Dated: November 23, 1993 Respectfully submitted,

WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO

BY:

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BOWLES & MOXON Laurie J. Bartilson

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